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Technology Law: 
Artificial Intelligence: Trust and Distrust1 
 
Robin C. Feldman 
 
Artificial intelligence (AI) is percolating through modern society. 
In the automobile industry, AI systems assist drivers with steering, 
changing lanes, and parking.  Early AI projects in the criminal-justice 
system predict where crime is likely to occur for the purpose of 
targeting policing.  Smart glasses tailored to business applications are 
emerging into the marketplace.  Eventually, these glasses will use 
machine learning to identify objects and voices, prompting the wearer 
to take certain actions or setting out a range of possible actions.  
Banking and insurance firms use AI to advise customers on financial 
services, assess consumer risk, and monitor for fraud.  Employers use 
AI systems in hiring decisions.  And in the healthcare field, invasive 
brain interfaces have demonstrated the ability for thought control of 
complex robotic limbs and virtual agents. 
As AI becomes a ubiquitous part of our everyday life, a key aspect 
will be the way in which society—and by extension, the legal system—
manages both the integration of these systems and society’s 
expectations.  Society will have to learn to trust the capacity of AI 
systems sufficiently so that it can soar to new heights, without 
succumbing to the “irrational exuberance”2 that can send society 
crashing to the ground when AI fails to live up to unreasonable 
expectations. And society must learn to tolerate the ambiguity that lies 
between these two extremes. 
 
The State of AI 
 
AI refers to any artificial agent that ingests data and responds to 
that data by completing a task.  The AI we have today is “narrow AI”: 
AI that can complete only one or a handful of pre-specified tasks.  We 
are nowhere near “Artificial General Intelligence—defined by its 
potentially unattainable ability to complete any task a human can, short 
                                                 
 1. Summarized and excerpted from Robin C. Feldman, Artificial 
Intelligence: The Importance of Trust and Distrust, 21 GREEN BAG 2D 201 
(2018). 
 2. Alan Greenspan, Francis Boyer Lecture of the American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research: The Challenge of Central Banking in a 
Democratic Society (Dec. 5, 1996). 
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of consciousness—let alone the type of AI that resembles a conscious 
mind. 
Still, advancement in AI has moved at an extraordinary pace.  
Deep learning, which is the basis for the entire field of AI, became 
practical in 2006, and, since then, the field has moved in leaps and 
bounds, analogous to what would be many lifetimes in other industries.  
Consider perhaps the highest profile modern network, Google’s 
AlphaGo, for which there have been at least four different versions 
since 2015.  The difference between the two latest versions of AlphaGo 
would be analogous to the difference between the first rudimentary 
touchscreen phone—the IBM Simon from 25 years ago—and this 
year’s new iPad Pro.  In the AI field, however, that advancement 
happened in under two years. 
The potential for truly sentient AI that can make decisions and 
operate on its own, however, remains in the minds of science fiction 
writers.  For now, and for the foreseeable future, human augmentation 
systems will be the norm, and the optimal configuration will be a 
melding of human and machine capability.  An example can be found 
in labor organization.  Siemens is currently developing a factory in 
which jobs are assigned to human workers by AI that knows a worker’s 
skill.  As a start, the AI will assign jobs that require human dexterity to 
humans while assigning jobs that can be done by robots to robots.  As 
robotic dexterity improves across time, the “boss AI” can assign jobs to 
humans on the basis of other skills that robots lack, such as language 
and reasoning.  As one of the researchers noted, one would not want to 
reduce humans to mere tools in any system because then “we would 
just use an expensive human as an imprecise robot.  When it comes to 
creativity and complex, intelligent tasks, this is where humans are 
superior.”  The goal is to “build systems that combine strengths from 
both sides.”3 
In short, for the foreseeable future, the best approaches are likely 
to be systems that can augment human capacity, rather than systems 
that replace human beings and operate entirely on their own.  For those 
who are movie buffs, think Iron Man, in which a weaponized suit 
enhances the protagonist’s capacities, as opposed to the Terminator, in 
which a machine-like cyborg does everything by itself.  And even that 
imagery may be optimistic.  As one expert commented to me, we can’t 
have anything remotely like Iron Man because machines are just plain 
dumb.  We still have to teach them what a stop sign is, and we are light 
years from a machine’s ability to think on its own. 
                                                 
 3. Sean Captain, This AI Factory Boss Tells Robots and Humans How to 
Work Together, FAST CO. (Aug. 7, 2017) (quoting Florian Michahelles). 
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How Trust and Distrust Can Enhance Vulnerabilities 
 
On the simplest level, people will have to be coaxed into using 
these newfangled devices.  This is not just a matter of encouraging 
those who are older than 40 to use social media.  Absent widespread 
usage, the full potential of AI systems may be limited. 
Consider the potential for true driverless cars, not the driver-
assisted versions that exist today, but cars that operate without any 
driver at all.  To achieve its maximum potential, driverless cars will be 
linked into networks with other driverless cars on the road.  Your car 
will not just slow down when it senses that the car in front of you has 
slowed down; your car could react when the network tells it that a car 
10 blocks ahead has altered its speed or trajectory.  With a networked 
system of this sort, particularly one that can react faster than humans, 
cars will need less space between them, and traffic flows can be 
maximized so that riders spend less time on the road and consume less 
fuel. 
Imagine the difficulties that arise if every now and then, we mix in 
a human driver.  The safety and efficiency calculations become much 
more complex and challenging as we increase the level of 
uncertainly—both the uncertainty of whether a car down the road is 
human driven as well as the uncertainty of what the human driver will 
choose to do.4  In fact, in the current tests of driverless car systems, 
some of the greatest difficulties flow from interacting with human 
drivers who are puzzlingly irrational.  The point is simply that some of 
the power of AI systems depends not just on whether humans can be 
coaxed into using them at all but also whether that use is widespread, 
even ubiquitous. 
Trust has other facets as well.  From a different perspective, both 
government and individuals in society will need to have confidence in 
the actions and choices made by AI technologies.  If we want ordinary 
citizens to have faith in the credibility of AI, there must be methods of 
analyzing and validating the choices made—trust but verify, as the old 
saying goes. 
The entire issue of verification is complicated by the black box 
nature of certain AI systems.  When decisions are being made that 
result in sending criminals to jail or choosing between killing the driver 
of an autonomous vehicle and a crowd of six, how do we develop the 
pathways for interrogating the technology to society’s satisfaction?  
                                                 
 4. See Matt Richtel & Conor Dougherty, Google’s Driverless Cars Run 
into Problems: Cars with Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2015). 
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And then, how do we translate that verification into language that will 
inspire confidence among all citizens? 
Both of these tasks will require a level of openness and candor that 
are not necessarily familiar to either industry or government players.  In 
particular, a company’s first instinct is unlikely to encompass throwing 
open the doors to its technology, particularly if competitors are peering 
into the open doorway.  Nevertheless, one cannot expect citizens to 
gain trust in AI simply because we say soothingly, “Don’t worry. 
We’ve got this covered.”  And the results of lack of trust can be far-
reaching.  What happens if all citizens, or even only certain groups of 
citizens, believe they cannot trust any information they are receiving on 
any level?  In that circumstance, the breakdown of trust can be more 
serious than the disarray that can develop when individuals opt out of a 
linked network. 
While trust is essential, overconfidence is detrimental.  
Overconfidence in AI can lead to unrealistic expectations of AI’s 
capacity, accuracy, and security.  Human judgment and interpretation 
remain crucial for responding to and recovering from the types of 
security incursions that AI technologies will face.  Just as one would 
not build a fence around a power plant and consider the plant to be 
secure, one cannot simply set up cybersecurity perimeters and consider 
the job done.  The strength of any networked system lies in its 
resilience after a vulnerability has been exploited or has caused harm. 
AI systems will be no exception.  Consider automobiles.  When 
networked, driverless cars become the norm, and vulnerabilities 
increase exponentially.  Any point throughout the vast network of cars 
becomes a potential door for malicious entry, and the damage may be 
far greater, given the extent of the network.  A hacker only need find 
one point of vulnerability throughout all of the cars and their car 
systems in order to make every car in the network run off the road. 
AI technologies are no more impregnable than any other 
technology.  In particular, machine learning technologies are dependent 
upon their input data.  When attackers corrupt that data, the system will 
continue to think it is operating properly.  One study, albeit a limited 
one, managed to confuse automated systems about the nature of stop 
signs by placing unobtrusive stickers on the signs.5  Another study, of 
medical devices, showed that heart pacemakers can be hacked.6 
                                                 
 5. See Jonathan M. Gitlin, Hacking Street Signs with Stickers Could 
Confuse Self-Driving Cars, ARSTECHNICA (Sept. 1, 2017). 
 6. See Natt Garun, Almost Half a Million Pacemakers Need a Firmware 
Update to Avoid Getting Hacked, THE VERGE (Aug. 30, 2017). 
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The mortal consequences of these vulnerabilities make human 
supervision imperative.  If an AI boss system is compromised and 
assigns English speakers to jobs that require Spanish proficiency, a 
human can easily detect this type of mistake.  Even more subtle attacks, 
like assigning the wrong specialist to a cybersecurity project, can be 
detected relatively easily by a human familiar with the project and its 
personnel. 
Even bread-and-butter data analysis is likely to work best with a 
combination of human and machine contributions.  Large streams of 
data are impossible for humans to inspect by hand.  Nevertheless, 
humans are far better than machines at playing detective, that is, 
noticing something that just does not seem right or finding an 
indication that points to a malware incursion and applying the creativity 
to figure out what is going on.  Thus, AI may be best for sorting 
network traffic into smaller, human-manageable groups of information 
that the more creative human counterparts can oversee. 
Perhaps the greatest potential risk of widespread adoption of AI is 
fear-inducing disruption.  Imagine an attacker who changes the 
manufacturing instructions for a single bottle of a medication, or a 
hacker who alters the pattern for one person’s pacemaker.  Although 
most of the medications or medical devices are perfectly fine, 
widespread fear could lead to great harm if patients refuse to take their 
medication, decline to have pacemakers installed, or demand to have 
them removed.  Panic, underlying anxiety, and erosion of trust can be 
widespread and culturally significant. 
In this way, trust and distrust can wrap back around each other to 
maximize the risk of chaos and societal disruption. Imagine a time in 
which each person has an implanted health device, call it a health 
regulator.  The device contains that person’s health information, 
monitors various bodily functions, and can even direct other 
implantable devices such as pacemakers or automated medicine-
dispensing mechanisms.  Say a recent immigrant from North Korea is 
seriously injured and comes to an urgent care center.  The patient’s 
health regulator alerts the medical team to the need for a blood 
transfusion and indicates that the patient’s blood type is AB negative.  
The team becomes suspicious because the blood type AB negative is 
almost nonexistent in the Korean population.  Further investigation 
reveals that the person’s health data was likely corrupted intentionally 
and that the problem most likely extends to other immigrants from 
North Korea. 
The fallout could be extensive.  Patients from North Korea might 
refuse to receive medical treatment.  Those fears could cascade 
throughout immigrant populations, or throughout patient populations in 
general.  The public in general or smaller groups in particular could 
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mistakenly believe that the corruption extends beyond the North 
Korean immigrant population.  People might fear that this corruption 
could be the beginning of larger incursions, either by this attacker or by 
others.  Meanwhile, the entire health system, accustomed to relying on 
the efficiency of its health regulators, would be thrown into disarray as 
medical professionals must decide how to treat patients and make 
medical decisions without that input, not to mention what information 
and devices remain reliable. 
The potential social implications also are profound.  Disruption of 
the healthcare system connected to a recent immigrant population 
creates the potential for backlash against immigrant populations in the 
United States and abroad.  Distrust of information in general could 
cascade to make various populations, particularly vulnerable 
populations such as new immigrants, unwilling to trust any information 
from the government, whether it is about the recent incursion in 
particular or health care in general.  Such an outcome could lead 
immigrant populations to look for other, perhaps less reliable, sources 
of information.  In short, a small and limited incursion could have 
extensive and profound effects on social cohesion and societal 
resources. 
 
The Problems with Reactive Adaptation 
 
In 1982, seven people died after taking Tylenol capsules 
adulterated with cyanide, an event that led to changes in medical 
packaging and to the creation of anti-tampering laws.7  One might think 
of this history as a fine analogy—a blueprint that the legal system may 
use in adapting modern legal systems to manage issues created by AI.  
The government’s reaction in the Tylenol case, however, was no more 
than a reaction, and reactive jurisprudence is seriously limited. 
The problem lies beyond the fact that when legal systems adapt in 
reaction, damage has already occurred.  Nor is the problem simply that 
one may not think clearly in the middle of a crisis.  The real problem is 
that by the time one chooses to react, the choices may be limited.  
Within the social compact, we relinquish certain liberties related to the 
ends for which we have united, but it behooves us to decide which 
liberties to relinquish and which to nurture at a time when we still have 
sufficient choices available.  Nowhere is this maxim more critical than 
at the dawn of a scientific revolution. 
                                                 
 7. See Ronald Reagan, Statement on Signing the Federal Anti-Tampering 
Act (Oct. 14, 1983). 
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Science is not immune to the dictates of the legal system.  Rather, 
science and law exist in a symbiotic relationship, with each having  
the ability to inform or obstruct the other.  Science creates pathways 
that drive legal regimes, because law cannot dictate what science 
cannot accomplish.  In turn, law affects the unfolding of scientific 
development and shapes the expectations of individual citizens.  When 
a car driven by a 16-year-old hits my car on the road, I expect the 
driver (or the driver’s insurance company) to pay for the damage.  I 
generally don’t expect remuneration from the local authorities, who 
made the bad judgment to grant a license to this 16-year-old, or from 
the driver’s parents, whose loose parenting styles might have 
influenced the level of driving care. 
These byways, into which we channel both human expectation and 
scientific development, are best carved with thoughtful intention.  The 
key will be to ensure that as these technologies permeate society, we 
design legal systems that embody appropriate levels of both trust and 
distrust. 
Within this context, one of the challenges to openness and access 
could be a rush to secure intellectual property rights in AI.  Trade 
secrets are, quite simply, secret.  Patents can also fail to provide 
complete transparency; particularly in fields related to artificial 
invention such as software, current doctrines require only that patents 
disclose the outcomes of the invention, not how to get there.8  Some 
other forms of invention rights might be needed. 
In addition, AI systems should be subject to review entirely outside 
the system itself by industry bodies or public bodies.  As an average 
citizen, I may never understand how a biologic interchangeable is being 
produced, at least not enough to trust that the drug is safe.  
Nevertheless, I might trust the FDA.  This form of institutionalized 
outside review, whether by private or public entities, will be essential 
for adequate trust and distrust. 
Regardless of the final routes chosen, the point is simply that 
society has an opportunity to craft legal regimes for AI on a broad 
scale.  We are at the dawn of an era.  Rather than stumbling blindly, we 






                                                 
 8. See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 104–27 (2012). 
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